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1 INTRODUCTION
The role and position of shareholderswithin a listed public company has been
a subject of debate on both the national and the international level for decades.
This debate focuses primarily on the rights that are, or perhaps, should be
conferred upon shareholders in such a company and, consequently, on the
active or effective exercise of those rights by the same shareholders. In this
contribution, we focus on one particular core concept, namely the right that
is conferred upon shareholders to put items on the agenda of the general
meeting. The right of shareholders to secure influence in the company through
a dialogue with the board can be considered as a core instrument within
company law that ensures the possibility of checks and balances within the
company. Whether under the shareholders’ or the stakeholders’ model, this
core concept is paramount for the legal structure of companies. Since the
general meeting is considered to be the traditional means through which
shareholders can exert influence in the investee company,1 the right to put
items on the agenda or to table resolutions for such a meeting can be con-
sidered to be a core right for shareholders since this is one of the few legal
possibilities though which they can exert influence if they so desire. The
exercise of this right enables shareholders to debate with the management of
the company they have invested in, but also with each other about all matters
This article draws and elaborates on forthcoming publications from the first-mentioned
author on the specific topic of shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda of the general
meeting.
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1 TheHigh-Level Group of Company LawExperts,Report of the High-Level Group of Company
Law Experts on a modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe, Brussels, 4 Nov.
2002, availableat<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_
en.pdf>, p. 49.
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that they deem to be of interest to their investments.2 This specific share-
holders’ right has been under scrutiny in the last two decades because of two
conflicting developments. On the one hand, the right has been introduced in
order to strengthen the position of shareholders within the public limited
company; firstlywhen it was formulated in the form of soft law and later when
it was codified on a national and European level. On the other hand, certain
parties have been looking for a way to diminish the shareholders’ influence
by counteracting the shareholders’ right to put an item on the agenda because
the corresponding shareholder activism led to alarm in certain sectors in society.3
In this contribution, we will focus on the development of this core right
for shareholders in theNetherlands, as codified in Book 2, Article 114(a) Dutch
Civil Code (hereafter: DCC), under the influence of both domestic and European
legislative developments, whichmight be conflictingwith each other.Wewill
put this specific development also within its broader context, namely within
the debate about the role and the position of shareholders in a public company.
This contribution is structured as follows. After this introduction, the
contribution will firstly address how the right to have items put on the agenda
was introduced in theNetherlands in the form of self-regulation. Subsequently,
the third section will focus on the codification of this right in the Netherlands
and the fourth section will provide an overview of the developments at EU
level that have an influence on the (wording of the) provision comprising the
right to put items on the agenda, whilst the fifth section will deal with the
domestic legislative developments regarding this Article as a response to
shareholder activism in the Netherlands. The final section will make some
concluding remarks about the influences of both developments on share-
holders’ right to put items on the agenda.
2 THE INCREASING ATTENTION FOR THE ROLE AND POSITION OF SHARE-
HOLDERS
As has been pointed out earlier, the shareholders’ right to (have the board)
put items on the agenda of the general meeting forms part and parcel of the
debate on the role and position of shareholders in listed public limited com-
panies (NV’s) in the Netherlands. Peters and Eikelboom even state that ‘the
right of listed companies to place items on the agenda appears to act in the
Netherlands as the point at which shareholders’ power andmanaging authority
2 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 49.
3 F.M. Peters & F. Eikelboom, Memorandum: the shareholders’ right to put items to the agenda
and the risk for the Dutch state of being liable due to breaches of EU law, May 2015, available
at <http://bureaubrandeis.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Artikel-Ingelse-veralgemeni
seerd.pdf?1d13cc>, p. 6.
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are balancing’.4 From the late 1980s and 1990s, the attention in the Netherlands
for this pivotal role has increased rapidly due to a growing awareness that
the role of shareholders and the general meeting in the corporate governance
of Dutch listed companies were marginalized as a consequence of the intro-
duction of the special two-tier board regime (de structuurregeling) for certain
‘big’ companies. As a result, the balance of power, or rather, the system of
checks and balances within Dutch listed companies was lost according to
some.5 The debate concerning the position of shareholders within listed com-
panies was part of a bigger corporate governance debate that took place in
Dutch society at that time. This debate was primarily focused on the viability
of the corporate governance structures of Dutch listed companies in light of
the growing internationalization of the Dutch economy and the increasing
international attention for the (marginalized) position of shareholders in listed
public companies. As a result of this wider debate, a so-called Corporate
Governance Committee was installed in April 1996.6
This committee – commonly referred to as the Peters Committee, after its
chairman – was asked to examine the viability of the then existing corporate
governance structures against the background of the continuing international-
ization of the Dutch economy and the increased international attention for
the role, position and influence of shareholders within listed companies.7 The
Committee notes, in its first interim report, that within Dutch listed companies
a great diversity of arrangements and structures exists that limits the influence
of shareholders within these companies.8 The Committee also specifies some
subjects (‘toetspunten’), including the company’s strategic policy, upon which
shareholders should, in the opinion of the Committee, be able to exert their
influence.9 The committee draws the conclusion that, in the context of the
desired dialogue and the accountability required from the board, it is pivotal
that shareholders can exert influence on the composition of the agenda of the
4 F.M. Peters & F. Eikelboom, The conflict between Boskalis and Fugro concerning the right to
place items on the agenda, available at <http://bureaubrandeis.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/08/19-05-15-Bureau-Brandeis-Engelse-vertaling-De-strijd-over-het-agenderingsrecht-
tussen-Boskalis-en-Fugro-DEF.pdf?1d13cc>, 2; F.M. Peters & F. Eikelboom, ‘De strijd over
het agenderingsrecht tussen Boskalis en Fugro’, WPNR 2015, 7061, p. 407.
5 B.F. Assink, ‘Facetten van verantwoordelijkheid in hedendaags ondernemingsbestuur’, in
B.F. Assink & D.A.M.H.W. Strik, Ondernemingsbestuur en risicobeheersing op de drempel van
een nieuw decennium: een ondernemingsrechtelijke analyse, preadvies van de Vereeniging
‘Handelsrecht’ 2009, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 20.
6 The Corporate Governance Committee was specifically set up as a result of an agreement
between the Association of Securities-Issuing Companies (de Vereniging Effecten Uitgevende
Ondernemingen) and the Amsterdam Stock Exchange Association (de Vereniging voor de
Effectenhandel). See Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 732, no. 5, p. 2.
7 The Corporate Governance Committee, Corporate Governance in Nederland. Een aanzet tot
verandering en een uitnodiging tot discussie, Amsterdam: Secretariaat Corporate Governance
1996, p. 9; Assink 2009, p. 20.
8 The Corporate Governance Committee 1996, p. 21
9 The Corporate Governance Committee 1996, p. 22.
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general meeting. The committee also emphasizes that although only some
companies have granted the right to put items on the agenda of the general
meeting to shareholders and holders of depository receipts in their articles
of association, management boards of listed companies should in principle
honour a timely request to put an item on the agenda of the general meeting,
unless compelling circumstances dictate otherwise.10 In its final report, the
Committee formulates 40 recommendations, including a specific recommenda-
tion regarding the right of shareholders to put items on the agenda of the
general meeting. This recommendation implies that requests of investors –
either shareholders and/or holders of depository receipts, who solely or jointly
represent one per cent of the issued capital or whose shares on the date of
convening the meeting have a market value of at least ƒ500,000 to place items
on the agenda of the general meeting should be honoured by the board or
the chairman of the supervisory board if they are submitted at least thirty days
before the date of the meeting, unless, in the opinion of the management or
supervisory board, the request conflicts with substantial interests of the com-
pany.11 Moreover, the Committee also recommends that if the board refuses
such a request, this notification shall be made explicit at the beginning of the
meeting. The board should also justify why it has refused to include the item
in drawing up the agenda.12 The committee explicitly chooses not to submit
proposals to amend existing legislation, because it argues that the implementa-
tion of the recommendations, in addition to existing legislation, can reinforce
the corporate governance structures of Dutch listed companies sufficiently.13
The committee also assumes that the listed companies will voluntarily imple-
ment the recommendations.14 In short, the right or power for shareholders
and holders of depository receipts to put an item on the agenda of the general
meeting should, if it is not provided for in the articles of association, be en-
sured through self-regulation.
3 THE (PRELUDE TO THE) CODIFICATION OF THE SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHT TO
PUT ITEMS ON THE AGENDA OF THE GENERAL MEETING
After the publication of the final report of the Peters Committee, aMonitoring
Committee was installed with the responsibility to examine to what extent
10 The Corporate Governance Committee 1996, p. 26. The committee defines abuse of rights
or a legitimate expectation that the request will only disrupt the orderly conduct of the
general meeting as such compelling circumstances.
11 Recommendation 30. See The Corporate Governance Committee, Corporate Governance in
Nederland. De Veertig Aanbevelingen, 25 juni 1997, < http://commissiecorporategovernance.nl/
commissie-peters>, pp. 29 and 36.
12 The Corporate Governance Committee 1997, p. 29.
13 The Corporate Governance Committee 1997, p. 4.
14 The Corporate Governance Committee 1997, p. 4.
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the recommendationswere implemented. The committee concluded, regarding
the functioning of the general meeting and the role of the investors, that in
this domain the gap between ambition and reality was significant and that
the slight movement regarding the (re)valuation of the position of investors
in listed companies was in contrast with international developments.15 The
Dutch government soon responded to the publication by stating that boards
of listed companies should honour reasonable requests by shareholders or
holders of depository receipts to put items on the agenda of the general
meetings and, moreover, indicated that a legislative reform on this specific
subject was under way. The right or power to put items on the agenda for
shareholders will, in the opinion of the government, enhance an open and
balanced communication between the directors and the capital, which is
necessary for proper accountability by the board towards the investors.16
The continued attention for and discussion about the corporate governance
structure of Dutch (listed) companies has also prompted the government to
request the Social and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, hereafter:
SER) to review and advise on the viability of the two-tier board regime (de
structuurregeling).17 Although the shareholders’ right to put items on the
agenda of the general meeting, strictly speaking, was not part of the request
for advice, the SER also discussed the position of shareholders in this two-tier
board regime and, consequently, also the right to put items on the agenda.
In its advisory report,18 the SER called for a revaluation of the position of
investors in two-tier companies, especially against the background of develop-
ments on the international securities markets. In the opinion of the SER, these
developments required a proper corporate governance system in the sense
that this system creates balanced relations between investors on the one hand
and the management and supervisory board on the other.19 The SER believed
that this desirable revaluation could in principle be realised in two ways,
namely (i) through legislative amendments which reinstate certain powers
of shareholders that were taken away by the introduction of the two-tier board
regime; and (ii) by introducingmeasures that enhance the position of investors
within listed companies. As part of the latter, the SER argued that the manage-
ment and supervisory boards should be required to honour a request from
15 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance,Monitoring Corporate Governance in Nederland:
bericht van de Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance en de uitkomsten van het onderzoek
verricht door het Economisch Instituut Tilburg (EIT), verbonden aan de Katholieke Universiteit
Brabant, Deventer: Kluwer 1998, p. 7 and 10.
16 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 25 732, no. 8, pp. 13 and 16.
17 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179, no. 3, p. 1 (MvT). Incidentally, the Dutch Lower Chamber
(de Tweede Kamer) also sought advice from the SER concerning this topic. Zie Kamerstukken
II 1999/2000, 25 372, no. 13.
18 The Social and Economic Council,Advies over het functioneren en de toekomst van de structuur-
regeling (advies van 19 January 2001, SER 01/02), Den Haag: Sociaal-Economische Raad
2001; Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 25 732, no. 17.
19 The Social and Economic Council 2001, p. 79.
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shareholders and/or holders of depositary receipts, who solely or jointly
represent at least one per cent of the issued share capital, to have an item put
on the agenda of the general meeting, unless this request conflicts with sub-
stantial interests of the company.20
The government responded quickly to the advisory report of the SER by stating
that it would undertake legislative action in order to adapt the two-tier board
regime in accordance with the aforementioned report.21 The government also
indicated that it would undertake an initiative to codify the shareholders’ right
to put items on the agenda of the general meeting. On 8 January 2002, the
government, in accordance with earlier statements, introduced a legislative
proposal that aimed to adapt the two-tier board regime and to enhance the
role of the general meeting as a platform for exchange of information.22 The
government also introduced this proposal in order to fulfil the then felt need
to improve the relationship between the investors and themanagement board
of investee companies. In accordance with the Peters Committee and the SER,
the proposal introduces inter alia a right to have an item put on the agenda
of the general meeting for one or more shareholders who solely or jointly
represent one per cent of the issued capital. Unlike the Peters Committee,
which introduces amarket value criterion representing ƒ 500,000, the Cabinet
suggests amarket value criterion of C= 50million.23 Companies can lower these
alternative24 criteria in their articles of association.25 The right to put items
on the agenda is also granted to holders of depositary receipts for shares issued
with the company’s cooperation.26 In addition to these eligibility thresholds,
the legislative proposal introduces some formal requirements regarding the
request to put an item on the agenda. Firstly, this request must be submitted
in writing. Moreover, the request must be filed at least 60 days prior to the
general meeting.27 The deadline for lodging the request can be shortened in
the articles of association.28 If the request is made by one ormore shareholders
20 The Social and Economic Council 2001, p. 84.
21 Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 25 732, no. 18.
22 Wetsvoorstel wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met aanpassing
van de structuurregeling, Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179, no. 2.
23 The government justifies this market value criterion by stating that a shareholder shows
engagement with the investee company through the investment of such an amount, regard-
less of the corresponding percentage of the share capital. Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179,
no. 3, p. 22.
24 F.J. Oranje, ‘Convocatie- en agenderingsrecht van aandeelhouders. Toegevoegde waarde
in het systeem van checks and balances tussen bestuur en aandeelhouders’, in: P.J. van
der Kost, R. Abma & G.T.M.J. Raaijmakers (eds.), Handboek onderneming en aandeelhouder,
Serie Onderneming en Recht, deel 69, Deventer: Kluwer 2012, pp. 275-305, p. 284.
25 Article 2:114a (3) DCC.
26 Article 2:114a (4) DCC.
27 Article 2:114a (1) DCC.
28 Article 2:114a (3) DCC.
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who have a sufficient interest in the company and the formal requirements
are satisfied, the request must in principle be honoured. This does not apply
if the request conflicts with a substantial interest of the company.29 A refusal
on this ground is conceivable, as follows from the explanatory memorandum
(de memorie van toelichting), if the sole aim of the series of items to be put on
the agenda is to seriously disrupt the order of the meeting.30 From the memo-
randum of reply (de nota naar aanleiding van het verslag) it follows that a refusal
is also justified in case the request comprises of an extreme series of items.31
Moreover, the general standards of reasonableness and fairness and abuse
of rights can also be seen as ’lower limits’, but the concrete interpretation of
these statutory provisions regarding the exercise of the shareholders’ right
to put items on the agenda of the general meeting remains unclear.32 After
the legislative proposal was accepted, the shareholders’ right to put items on
the agenda was embedded in law with the introduction of the Act to amend
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code in connection with the adaptation of the two-
tier board structure regime,33 which entered into force on October 1, 2004.34
The exercise of this right can be refused if substantial interests of the company
conflict with the exercise of the right or if such exercise is in conflict with
general standards of reasonableness and fairness and is tantamount to abuse
of law. The management and/or supervisory board do not have the right of
a substantive assessment of the issues that investors – shareholders or holders
of depositary receipts – request to be put on the agenda. Consequently, the
investors could vote and/or decide on topics regarding which the general
meeting is not formally authorized to make decisions, such as the strategy
of the company, which is formally reserved for the management board. How-
ever, if the general meeting has decided on such a topic, this is to be seen as
a decision (beslissing), but not as a resolution (besluit). Consequently, the
outcome of such a vote is not binding and can be brushed aside by the man-
agement board.35
29 Article 2:114a (3) DCC. See also F.G.K. Overkleeft, ‘Het agenderingsrecht voor aandeelhou-
ders in beursvennootschappen: een aanzet tot (her)bezinning’,Ondernemingsrecht 2009, 167,
pp. 714-723, p. 715.
30 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179, no. 3, p. 21. See also Overkleeft 2009, p. 715.
31 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179, no. 5, p. 24. See also Overkleeft 2009, p. 715.
32 Overkleeft 2009, p. 715.
33 Wet van 9 juli 2004 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met
aanpassing van de structuurregeling, Stb. 2004, 370.
34 Stb. 2004, 405.
35 Overkleeft 2009, p. 717.
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4 SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS IN MOTION: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SHARE-
HOLDERS RIGHTS’ DIRECTIVE
At European level, the attention for the role and position of shareholders in
listed companies also increased, especially after corporate scandals involving
companies such as Enron and WorldCom in the US and Parmalat, Vivendi
andMannesmann in Europe. The idea was that in a proper corporate govern-
ance system, those types of scandals would not take place. In reaction to the
corporate scandals, the European Commission extended the mandate of a so-
calledHigh-Level Group of Company Law Experts (hereafter: the High-Level
Group), chaired by Jaap Winter, to address a number of issues related to best
practices in corporate governance and auditing.36 The focus of the group is
on strengthening the – cross-border – exercise of shareholders’ rights and
solving the problems associated with cross-border voting. In its report, the
High Level Group focused inter alia on the position of shareholders within
European listed companies. The group argued that ‘in a proper system of
corporate governance, shareholders should have effective means to actively
exercise influence over the company’.37 In their perspective, the shareholders
– as the residual claimholders – needed to be able to ensure that management
pursues – and remains accountable to – their interests. The traditional means
for shareholders to exercise this influence is, in the opinion of the High Level
Group, through the general meeting, as this is the forum where shareholders
can debatewith themanagement board and each other, and vote on resolutions
put forward to them.38 Moreover, the group also stated that ‘the right for
shareholders to submit proposals for general meeting decisions plays an
important role in the corporate context’.39 However, in the opinion of the
High Level Group, the legal requirements or restrictions with respect to those
rights often prevent small shareholders from being active.40 Therefore, the
group asked, in its consultative document, whether there was a need, at EU
level, to provide for minimum standards regarding the right for shareholders
to ask questions and submit proposals for decision-making at the general
meeting. The respondents saw no ground for doing so, however, and for that
reason the group concluded by recommending that the threshold for the right
to put items on the agenda of the general meeting should not exceed 5% of
the issued capital and that the EuropeanUnion should consider imposing this
36 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 1. Until then, the High-Level
Group was requested to make recommendations on a modern regulatory framework in
the EU for company law and this group dealt in particular with issues related to the
Takeover Bids Directive.
37 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 48.
38 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 49.
39 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 51.
40 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 51.
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as aminimum rule onMember States.41 Furthermore, listed companies should
be required to explicitly disclose to their shareholders how they can ask
questions, how and to what extent the company intends to answer questions,
and how and under what conditions they can submit proposals to the share-
holders’ meeting. This should, in the opinion of the group, be an element of
the mandatory annual corporate governance statement of listed companies.42
The EuropeanCommission responded quickly to the findings of theHigh-
Level Group and in May 2003 published its ’Action Plan for Modernisation
of the corporate law and enhancement of corporate governance in the European
Union’.43 In this action plan, the Commission stated that ‘recent financial
scandals have prompted a new, active debate on corporate governance, and
the restoration of confidence is onemore reason for new initiatives at EU level.
Investors, large and small, are demanding more transparency and better
information on companies, and are seeking to gainmore influence on the way
the public companies they own operate.’44 Consequently, there is a need ‘for
enhancing the exercise of a series of shareholders’ rights in listed companies’.45
Therefore, the Commission concluded ‘that some new tailored initiatives should
be taken with a view to enhancing shareholder rights’.46 These initiatives
resulted, finally, in the adoption of the Directive on the exercise of certain
rights of shareholders in listed companies (hereafter: the Shareholders’ Rights
Directive (SRD)), which was published on July 11, 2007.47 This Directive, as
expected, was aimed at strengthening the – cross-border – exercise of share-
holders’ rights and solving the problems associated with cross-border voting.
The objective of the Directive was the effective exercise of the (voting) rights
throughout the European Community,48 as (i) effective shareholder control
is a prerequisite to sound corporate governance; and (ii) these rights are
reflected in the price to be paid at the acquisition of the shares.49 Therefore,
as follows from the same preamble, ‘certain minimum standards should be
41 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 52.
42 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 74.
43 The EuropeanCommission.Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament. Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European
Union – A Plan to Move Forward. COM (2003), 284 final.
44 The European Commission 2003, p. 7.
45 The European Commission 2003, p. 14.
46 The European Commission 2003, p. 8.
47 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17.
48 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 14, p. 19.
49 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 3, p. 17.
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introduced with a view to protecting investors and promoting the smooth and
effective exercise of shareholder rights attaching to voting shares’.50
The Directive also paid particular attention to the right to put items on
the agenda of the general meeting. According to the preamble, shareholders
should in principle have the opportunity to put items on the agenda of the
general meeting and to table draft resolutions for items on the agenda.51 The
exercise of this right should, as follows from the preamble, be made subject
to two basic rules, namely (i) that any threshold required for the exercise of
those rights should not exceed 5% of the company’s share capital; and (ii) that
all shareholders should in every case receive the final version of the agenda
in sufficient time to prepare for the discussion and voting on each item on
the agenda.52 The shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda as such is
laid down in Section 6 of the Directive. This article requires Member States
to ensure that shareholders, acting individually or collectively, have the right
to put items on the agenda, provided that each such item is accompanied by
a justification or by a draft resolution to be adopted in the general meeting.53
Shareholders also have the right to table draft resolutions for items included
or to be included on the agenda of the general meeting.54 The requesting
shareholder should, however, hold a minimum stake in the company55 and
the request must be lodged within the time limit laid down in national legis-
lation.56
The implementation of this Directive into national legislation had the effect
that the then existing Article 2:114a DCC needed to be amended. Before the
implementation, this Article granted the possibility for the management and/or
supervisory board to refuse the request for inclusion of items on the agenda
on the ground that the request conflicted with substantial interests of the
company. This ground for refusal, with the entry into force of the Shareholders’
Rights Act57 on July 1, 2010,58 was deleted as the Directive did not contain
50 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 4, p. 17.
51 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 7, p. 18.
52 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 7, p. 18.
53 Section 6 (1)(a) SRD.
54 Section 6 (1)(b) SRD.
55 Section 6 (2) SRD. It is up to the national legislator to decide upon the minimum stake a
shareholder has to hold in a company in order to be eligible to exercise the right, but such
minimum stake, as laid down in national legislation, shall, in accordance with the recom-
mendations of the High-Level Group, not exceed 5% of the share capital.
56 Section 6 (3) SRD.
57 Wet van 30 juni 2010 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Wet op
het financieel toezicht ter uitvoering van richtlijn nr. 2007/36/EG van het Europees Parle-
ment en de Raad van de Europese Unie van 11 juli 2007 betreffende de uitoefening van
bepaalde rechten van aandeelhouders in beursgenoteerde vennootschappen, Stb. 2010, 257.
58 Stb. 2010, 258.
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any explicit ground to refuse a request.59 In addition, the requirement to have
the request accompanied by a justification or by a draft resolution to be adop-
ted in the general meeting was added, in accordance with Section 6 (1)(a) SRD.
The new Article 2:114a DCC also provides for the shareholders’ right to table
draft resolutions for items included or to be included on the agenda of the
general meeting. Consequently, the management board and/or supervisory
board can no longer refuse a request by invoking the aforementioned ground
for refusal. The board may, however, still refuse a request where the exercise
of the right to put items on the agenda is in conflict with the standards of
reasonableness and fairness or where there is abuse of rights.60
5 SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS IN MOTION: THE RIGHT TO PUT ITEMS ON THE
AGENDA UNDER (DOMESTIC) SCRUTINY AFTER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Next to the developments at the European level as described above, therewere
also developments at the national level that put the exercise of shareholders’
rights under scrutiny. In particular, increased shareholder activism and in-
famous conflicts within Dutch listed companies between the board and share-
holders about the strategy of the company were reasons for the Corporate
Governance Code Monitoring Committee61 to reevaluate the relationship
between the company and its shareholders in theDutch corporate governance
model, including an evaluation of the exercise of the right to put items on the
agenda by shareholders.62 In December 2006, the Monitoring Committee
published a document for consultation containing several proposals regarding
the relationship between the company and its shareholders. The reactions to
this consultation indicated broad support for the Committee’s initial proposals.
Consequently, the Committee advised the government to lay down further
rules of play concerning the relationship between the company and its share-
59 F.M. Peters & F. Eikelboom 2015a, p. 4. These authors refer to the reply of the Minister
of Justice in the memorandum of reply (de nota naar aanleiding van het verslag), Kamerstukken
II 2008/09, 31 746, no. 7, p. 5.
60 In Stork, however, the Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled, by
way of injunctive relief, that the general meeting could not vote on an item put forward
by shareholders, i.e. the removal of the supervisory board, because this was in conflict with
standards of reasonableness and fairness. One could argue that the ground for refusal in
this case is also that the removal of the supervisory board conflicted with – in short –
substantial interests of the company and, consequently, the item was in conflict with
standards of reasonableness and fairness. See Court of Appeal Amsterdam (Enterprise
Division) 17 January 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZ6440, JOR 2007, 42 with commentary
from J.M. Blanco Fernández (Stork).
61 This Committee was originally installed to monitor the implementation of the first Dutch
Corporate Governance Code.
62 Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, Advisory report on the company-
shareholder relationship and on the scope of the Code, available at <http://www.corpgov.
nl/advies-kabinet-2007>, p. 8.
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holders through an elaboration of the then existing Dutch Corporate Govern-
ance Code, commonly referred to as the Code Tabaksblat, after the chairman
of the committee that drafted the Dutch Code, and also puts forth some
recommendations regarding legislative action.63 Two of the proposed rules
of play pertain to the shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda of the
general meeting. One should, however, keep in mind that the provisions of
the Dutch Corporate Governance Code are not binding and, moreover, are
predominantly addressed to the listed company.
First, the Committee introduced a so-called response time for themanage-
ment board. The Committee considers that it is good practice for shareholders
to exercise the right to put an item on the agenda only after they have raised
it with themanagement board of the company in case the proposed item could
lead to a change in the strategy of the company, such as the dismissal of the
management board members and/or supervisory board members.64 In such
an instance, the board has to be given the opportunity to formulate a reaction
during a reasonable period of time. The Committee proposes a response time
of a maximum of 180 days, since this period should suffice for the board to
have further deliberation and constructive consultation with (other) share-
holders and to form an opinion on the view of the investor and possible
alternatives.65 The proposal regarding the response period was included as
best-practice provision IV.4.4 in the revised Code Tabaksblat, which was
commonly referred to as the Code Frijns, after the chair of the Monitoring
Committee.66 A shareholder shall, in accordance with this best-practice pro-
vision, exercise the right to put an item on the agenda only after he has con-
sulted the management board about this. If one or more shareholders intend
to request that an item be put on the agenda that may result in a change in
the company’s strategy, themanagement board shall be given the opportunity
to stipulate a reasonable period in which to respond (the response time). This
shall also apply to an intention as referred to above for judicial leave to con-
vene a general meeting pursuant to Article 2:110 DCC. Moreover, the share-
holder shall respect the response time stipulated by the management board
within the meaning of best-practice provision II.1.9.67 Although the provision
is in principle addressed to the listed company,68 it limits the exercise of the
63 Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, 2007, p. 3. The Committee considers
that such further rules ‘are necessary to regulate the company-shareholder relationship
in order to ensure that the processes involving the management board, supervisory board
and shareholders (i.e. the general meeting of shareholders) pass off smoothly and that the
best possible balance is struck between the various interests’.
64 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code 2007, p. 6.
65 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code 2007, pp. 15 & 16.
66 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code, De Nederlandse corporate governance
code. Beginselen van deugdelijk ondernemingsbestuur en best practice bepalingen, 10 december
2008, http://commissiecorporategovernance.nl/download/?id=609.
67 Oranje 2012, p. 292; Overkleeft 2009, p. 721.
68 Overkleeft 2009, p. 721, under cit. 58.
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shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda since it only allows them to
exercise this right after a consultation with the board and after respecting a
possible response time the board could invoke.
The Committee’s second recommendation with regard to the right to put
items on the agenda is directed to the legislator. Although the right to put
an item on the agenda was not covered by the consultation document itself,
it became apparent from the reactions to the consultation document that there
was a need for raising the admissibility barrier. The Committee therefore
recommended to the legislator that the position with regard to the right to
put items on the agenda should be brought into linewith international practice
and that the threshold should be raised to 3%.69 The Committee is of the
opinion that the market value criterion of C= 50 million could be abolished.70
In reaction to the advisory report of the Committee, the Minister of Finance
readily accepted this specific recommendation and proceeded to an adjustment
of the then current rules accordingly. The Minister also acknowledged that
raising the threshold would mean a limitation of the shareholders’ right on
the one hand, but stressed on the other hand that without it, activist share-
holders, who represent a relatively small percentage of the voting rights, would
be able to have a significant impact on the general meeting.71 This would
put such a strain on the balance of power in the Dutch corporate governance
system72 that raising the threshold to 3 per cent and abolishing the market
value criterion were desirable.73 The government on 3 January 200874 pub-
lished a draft for an Act implementing these rules, also referred to as ‘the Act
Frijns’, which was passed on 24 July 2009.75 Article 2:114a DCC has been ad-
justed accordingly by the entering into force of the Act Frijns.76 The new
provision entered into force on 1 July 2013.77 The introduction of this Act
puts a further restriction on the shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda
of the general meeting as only shareholders and holders of depository receipts
that solely or jointly represent three per cent of the issued capital have this
right as opposed to the situation prior to the Act Frijns.
However, these domestic regulatory developments seem to be in conflict
with the objective of the European Directive, namely the effective exercise of
69 Furthermore, this 3% threshold is also in keeping with the threshold proposed by the
Monitoring Committee for control disclosure. SeeMonitoring Committee Corporate Govern-
ance Code 2007, p. 22.
70 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code 2007, p. 20.
71 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31 083, no. 1, p. 7.
72 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31 083, no. 1, p. 2.
73 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31 083, no. 1, p. 7.
74 Zie Overkleeft 2009, p. 721.
75 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 014, no. 2.
76 Wet van 15 november 2012 tot wijziging van de Wet op het financieel toezicht, de Wet
giraal effectenverkeer en het Burgerlijk Wetboek naar aanleiding van het advies van de
Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code van 30 mei 2007, Stb. 2012, 588.
77 Stb. 2012, 693.
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shareholders’ rights throughout the European Community. If the board invokes
the response time, shareholders are obliged to respect this response time and,
consequently, have to wait for at most 180 days before the issue forwarded
by them is discussed in the general meeting. One could argue that this
response time delays and therefore hinders the effective exercise of the right
to put items on the agenda. Subsequently, the increase of the threshold to 3%
can also be seen as a further limitation of (the exercise) of shareholders’ right
to put items on the agenda. The new Article 2:114a DCC, however, is in con-
formity with the Directive, as the threshold does not exceed the maximum
threshold of 5%. In short, the rules are in conformity with European legislation,
but one may doubt if the rules, and the response time in particular, are fully
in line with the underlying objective of the Directive. Although shareholders
must realize that differentiations in national approaches of member states in
the EU with regard to shareholders’ rights that are in conformity with the
Directive are allowed, (foreign) shareholders might be surprised by such ‘local
arrangements’ to the core concept of the shareholders’ right to put items on
the agenda.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The regulatory developments on a national and European level regarding the
role and position of shareholderswithin a listed public company as illustrated
with regard to the core right for shareholders in a listed company to put items
on the agenda of the general meeting, seem to be moving in opposite
directions. On a national level, theDutch legislator is endeavouring to counter-
act shareholder activism by limiting shareholders’ right to put an item on the
agenda by introducing a response period for the board in the Dutch Corporate
Governance Code during which shareholders cannot exercise this right and
by raising the threshold from 1% to 3% of the issued share capital in a listed
company. On the EU level, the role of shareholders as a “watchdog” not only
on their own behalf, but also on behalf of other stakeholders, is emphasized
in the current debate on corporate governance. Effective shareholder control
is a prerequisite to sound corporate governance and as such, a proper system
of corporate governance should ensure the effective exercise of the right for
shareholders to put items on the agenda of the general meeting in order to
have the means to actively exercise influence upon the company. The Dutch
Civil Code and accompanying legislation as discussed fall within these norms
and are in conformity with the Directive. However, since the objective of the
Directive is to allow shareholders to make effective use of their rights through-
out the Community, one may wonder whether the rules introduced are in
conformity with the objectives of the Directive.
